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For the past several decades, much American lawmaking has been animated by a concern for 
economic efficiency. At the same time, broad concerns over wealth and income inequality have roiled 
American politics, and still loom over lawmakers. It can be reasonably argued that a tension exists 
between efficiency and equality, but that argument has had too much purchase over the past few decades 
of lawmaking. What has been overlooked is that inequality itself can be allocatively inefficient when it 
gives rise to collectively inefficient behavior. Worse still, some lawmaking only masquerades as being 
efficiency-promoting; upon closer inspection, some of this supposedly efficiency-driven legislation is only 
naked rent-seeking, enriching a small minority at the expense of social welfare. In pursuit of efficiency, 
injudicious lawmaking has created inefficient laws and institutions. 
This Article lays out several ways in which inequality can be allocatively inefficient. This Article 
also lays out a simple normative principle, focusing on broad economic effects, by which efficiency 
rationales for lawmaking might be more rigorously considered. Importantly, while it is lawmaking and 
not economic policymaking that is the focus of this article, it is essential that lawmaking be adequately 
informed by serious economic analysis, and not the intellectually casual, ideologically-driven economics 
that has opened the door to rent-seeking over the past several decades. The resulting lawmaking creates 
inequality but does not even produce the promised efficiencies. Better lawmaking must be informed by 
better economics. After all, if inequality is objectionable because it is inefficient, then measures to reduce 
inequality should themselves be efficient. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of economic inequality in the United States has already roiled 
presidential politics, and still retains the potential to reshape, if not realign, both the 
Republican and Democratic parties. The temptation is to think of inequality as an 
economic problem with economic solutions. There is just enough truth in such a view 
to mask a more fundamental source: legal rules and institutions. After all, an 
economy is defined by the legal rules and institutions that allocate resources and 
govern transacting.  
At the same time, American lawmaking has unmistakably taken on more of an 
emphasis on economic efficiency as a normative principle. Over the past fifty years or 
so, economic considerations have played an increasing role in lawmaking, helping to 
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establish the new field of Law and Economics.1 It is difficult to overstate the influence 
of Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law,2 the first (of nine and counting) edition 
published in 1973,3 and Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox,4 both of which succeeded in 
dramatically reshaping the way that legal scholars and judges think about law. In 
Reiter v. Sonotone,5 the Court, citing Bork,6 brushed aside nearly seven decades of 
antitrust jurisprudence and policy that was oriented around the preservation of 
competition7 and substituted Bork’s prescribed economic efficiency orientation.8 
Judge Posner’s textbook, in the meantime, is commonly thought to be one of the most 
influential works of the twentieth century, by one of the most influential scholars of 
his time.9 
The influence on law and economics scholars such as Judges Posner and Bork 
is perhaps most obvious in written judicial opinions, in which the reasoning is 
expected to be explicit, at least more so than any foray into legislative history. The 
influence of economic considerations on legislators is thus less obvious but just as 
profound. Major legislative initiatives in welfare reform,10 tax reform,11 financial 
                                                 
1 For a brief survey of the influence of economics on law and policymaking, see NICHOLAS MERCURO & 
STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM AND BEYOND 4–5 (2d ed. 
2006). 
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014). 
3 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1973). 
4 ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 61 (1978).  
5 442 U.S. 330 (1979).  
6 Id. at 343 (citing ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978)). 
7   See Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2255 (2013); see also Eleanor 
M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2159 (2013) (“The operational goal … is to let business 
be free of antitrust unless its acts will decrease aggregate consumer surplus…. But this is not the goal of 
antitrust unless the concept of ‘goal’ reads ninety years out of antitrust history.”). 
8  BORK, supra note 4, at 90 (“Consumer welfare is the greatest when society’s economic resources are 
allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as technological constraints permit. 
Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for the wealth of the nation.”). 
9 MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 1, at 102. 
10 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, PUB. L No. 104-93, 110 STAT. 
2105 (1996) (ended the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, commonly referred to as 
“welfare,” and substituted a package of programs to limit the amount of time that needy people can 
receive federal aid and provide job training benefits). For a review, see Jerry Watts & Nan Marie Astone, 
The End of Work and the End of Welfare, 26 CONTEMP. SOC. 409 (1997). The legislation was highly 
controversial (and has again become so recently), and was driven in part by an efficiency rationale: that 
aid dulled incentives to work. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the Cooperative 
Federalism of America’s Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 128–30 (1996). 
11   See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Introduction, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 1, 6 (Joel Slemrod 
ed., 1996); Robert K. Triest, The Efficiency Cost of Increased Progressivity, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY 137, 138–39 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1996). 




institution regulation,12 as well as deregulation of electric utilities,13 railroads,14 
airlines,15 and even environmental law,16 have been justified as enhancing economic 
efficiency. At seemingly every turn, any legislative or regulatory proposal is touted 
as one that makes the American economy more efficient. To be sure, some of the 
economic claims made by lawmakers who lack even the most basic economic training 
lack credibility.17 But that has hardly stopped lawmakers from invoking economic 
efficiency, whether they know what it is or not.  
Unfortunately, whether lawmakers are complicit or genuinely duped by rent-
seeking industries,18 the result of efficiency-driven lawmaking is often inefficiency. If 
lawmakers do not have the tools or the training to strictly apply an efficiency 
standard espoused by economists,19 they have often used proxies, such as jobs, 
competitiveness, and cost-reduction for economic efficiency. But if these proxies are 
not a sleight of hand, they are an opening for rent-seeking. Jobs-counting is a 
numerical game, but it conveys no information about the value of jobs; job creation 
can be offered as justification for a subsidy to a dying industry. Helping domestic 
industries compete suggests greater domestic economic efficiency but fails to account 
for whether the domestic industry enjoys a comparative advantage over foreign 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., infra Part III.A. 
13 Reed W. Cearley & Daniel H. Cole, Stranded Benefits Versus Stranded Costs in Utility Deregulation, in 
THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND 
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 169 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003). 
14  See, e.g., Jerry Ellig, Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare, 21 J. REG. ECON. 143, 144–46 (2002). 
15 Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 321 (1988) (“The last ten years 
have fully vindicated our expectations that deregulation would bring lower fares, a structure of fares on 
average in closer conformity with the structure of costs . . . and great improvements in efficiency . . . .”). 
16 See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 ECOL. L.W. 303, 337–42 
(2004). 
17 To take just one example of the abysmal economic ignorance in certain quarters of the U.S. Congress, 
such as Florida Congressman Ted Yoho, a large animal veterinarian, and Arizona Congressman David 
Schweikert, a real estate developer, who led calls to reject an increase in the U.S. debt ceiling on the 
grounds of fiscal thrift, but which would have triggered an unprecedented default with globally 
catastrophic consequences. See, e.g., Carmel Lobello, 3 Crazy Arguments From Debt Ceiling Deniers, THE 
WEEK (Oct. 10, 2013), http://theweek.com/articles/458997/3-crazy-arguments-from-debt-ceiling-deniers. 
For a scholarly discussion of the implications of a default, see, for example, Steven L. Schwarcz, Rollover 
Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2014).  
18 Rent-seeking is the practice of seeking privately favorable government policy with negative social value. 
See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN 
PUBLIC CHOICE 43 (2002). 
19 POSNER, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
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competitors.20 Reducing production costs seems like it must be efficient, except when 
it does so by allowing an industry to externalize its costs.21  
I hasten to emphasize that all of this Article is not a condemnation of economic 
efficiency as a public policy criteria. This Article is an effort to provide equal time for 
an under-appreciated counterweight to the prevailing views on efficiency and the law: 
that inequality itself is a source of inefficiency. Wealth or income inequality, if severe 
enough, gives rise to behavior which may be individually rational but collectively 
inefficient. This Article sets out several pathways in which this might be the case. 
This Article is also an exposition of how an ill-informed invocation of economic 
efficiency can lead to bad lawmaking—unjust by any reasonable definition but, more 
prominently and ironically, inefficient lawmaking. The upshot of this exposition is 
that economics must play a more prominent role in lawmaking, not less. What is 
needed is a more exacting scrutiny of economic claims made in support of lawmaking 
initiatives invoking economic efficiency as one of its goals. 
I emphasize that this Article does not argue that inequality is per se inefficient. 
Juxtaposed against the arguments raised in this Article are a countervailing set of 
arguments that inequality is not only something to be tolerated but even a necessary 
ingredient for prosperity.22 Circumstance and history dictate which arguments are 
more applicable, both sets of arguments playing a crucial role in ordering well-
functioning societies but in different places and at different times. That said, I do 
argue that the debate over economic efficiency inequality has lost its balance, and 
that the suite of efficiency-maximizing, inequality-tolerating arguments have come 
to dominate public law and policymaking, and have become unhinged from sound 
economic theory. Part I of this Article describes the sometimes fraught relationship 
the economics profession has had with inequality. Part II sets out how, as a result of 
this ambivalence, a set of arguments for de-emphasizing or even ignoring inequality 
has held too much sway over public lawmaking and economic policymaking. Part III 
sets forth several reasons why inequality may be allocatively inefficient. In so doing, 
Part III draws upon economic research that examines the linkages between 
inequality and economic growth as a proxy for allocative efficiency. Part IV of this 
Article argues that the key to reducing inequality lies not in redistribution for its own 
sake but on policies that focus on economic growth. That is not to say that 
redistributions cannot spur economic growth; every law or policy affects a 
                                                 
20 An “absolute advantage” is the greater technological ability of one country over another to produce some 
good. Of more relevance for international trade purposes, a “comparative advantage” is the greater 
economic ability of one country, given its factors of production, to produce some good. In other words, a 
country at an absolute disadvantage but a comparative advantage enjoys lower factors of production that 
can compensate for its lesser technological ability to produce the good. See, e.g., Shelby D. Hunt & Robert 
M. Morgan, The Comparative Advantage Theory of Competition, 59 J. MARKETING 1, 5 n.8 (1995). 
21 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF L. REV. 
1, 3 (1985).  
22 See infra text accompanying note 46. 




redistribution to some degree. Effective legal responses to inequality, however, should 
be informed by sound economic analysis. 
I. ECONOMISTS ON INEQUALITY  
In attention to enabling rent-seeking, ignorance of basic economic principles 
has prevented lawmakers from appreciating the efficiency problems raised by 
inequality. It has not helped that most economists have, until recently, stayed out of 
the inequality discussion.23 Nobel Laureate and University of Chicago economist, 
Robert Lucas, once opined in an essay, even while acknowledging that the world had 
become “a world of staggering and unprecedented income inequality,” that economists 
should nevertheless avoid trying to reverse inequality.24 Lucas warned that “[o]f the 
tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my 
opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.” 25 On the subject 
of inequality per se, there would appear to be little for economists to say anyway. 
Without a principled way of aggregating individual preferences into a social welfare 
function that can serve as a maximand,26 there is no obvious economic reason for 
choosing one distributional state of affairs over another.27  
Several prominent economists have ventured into the normative thickets of 
inequality work.28 These scholars include Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz;29 Sir Tony 
Atkinson, the author of perhaps the most prominent and long-standing body of work 
on inequality and poverty;30 and Thomas Piketty, the author of the sensationally 
                                                 
23 ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 14–15 (2015); Anthony B. Atkinson & Francois 
Bourguignon, Introduction: Income Distribution and Economics 1, 2–4, in HANDBOOK OF INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION (Anthony Atkinson & Francois Bourguignon eds., 2000).  
24 Robert E. Lucas, Jr., The Industrial Revolution, Past and Future, 2003 Annual Report Essay, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (May 1, 2004), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-
region/the-industrial-revolution-past-and-future. 
25 Id. 
26 Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POLIT. ECON. 328, 328–30 (1950).  
27  But see Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 
20 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2006). 
28 See, e.g., ATKINSON & BOURGUIGNON, supra note 233; ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & FRANCOIS BOURGUIGNON, 
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, VOLUMES 2A–2B (2014) (which included prominent economists such 
as Amartya K. Sen, Agnar Sandmo, Daron Acemoglu, and Thomas Piketty.). 
29 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIETIES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THEM (2015); 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2013). 
30 See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 23; Atkinson & Bourguignon, supra note 23; ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, 
ECONOMIC AND INEQUALITY (1975); ANTHONY BARNES ATKINSON AND ALLAN JAMES HARRISON, THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL WEALTH IN BRITAIN (1978). A very long list of Atkinson’s work can be found at 
http://www.tony-atkinson.com/.  
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successful book Capital in the Twenty-First Century.31 Piketty’s Capital has forced 
inequality into public intellectual debate but has been broadly criticized,32 and most 
economists and economics-oriented legal scholars have still simply shrugged, “so 
what?”33 
So what, indeed? As many have pointed out, the lives of so many people in the 
world have improved vastly over the past several decades, even as inequality has 
increased,34 so really, is there anything wrong with inequality per se? From a 
perspective that focuses on overall wealth rather than its distribution, it might seem 
a bit petty to begrudge the fact that while the poor are better off, the rich are so much 
                                                 
31 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 2014) (originally published as Le capital au XXI siècle (2013)). Piketty’s book itself represents the 
culmination of two decades of work by himself and a group of economists focusing on economic inequality. 
See generally, Facundo Alvarado, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, & Emmanuel Saez, The Top 1 
Percent in International and Historical Perspective, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013); Phillipe Aghion, Abhiji 
Banerjee, & Thomas Piketty, Dualism and Macroeconomic Volatility, 114 Q. J. ECON. 1359 (1999); A.B. 
ATKINSON & T. PIKETTY, TOP INCOMES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2010); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 
A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation, 81 ECONOMETRICA 1851 (2013); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel 
Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20625, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/ 
SaezZucman2014.pdf. 
 32 See, Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Piketty on Inequality, IGM FORUM (Oct. 14, 2014, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_5v7Rxbk8Z3k3F2t. 
See also infra notes 204–06. 
 33 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, 113 U. MICH. L. REV. 833, 836 (2015) (“Is 
there a problem? If r > g were embedded in a larger pattern in which g was relatively impressive—or 
even perhaps where g increased with the inequality—then for many observers there would be no problem 
to solve.”); N. Gregory Mankiw, Yes, r > g. So What? 105 AM. ECON. REV. 43 (2015); Richard Epstein, The 
Piketty Fallacy, REALCLEARPOLITICS (May 6, 2014), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articl 
es/2014/05/06/the_piketty_fallacy_122547.html (“One of the most striking defects of the Piketty analysis 
is its flawed understanding of the relationship between social wealth and income inequality. . . . [A]s an 
economic matter, the increase of the wealth of some without a decline of wealth in others counts as a 
Pareto improvement, which is in general to be welcomed, even if it increases overall levels of inequality.”); 
Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Thomas Piketty is Wrong: America Will Never Look Like a Jane Austen 
Novel, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 31, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/118925/ pikettys-capital-
theory-misunderstands-inherited-wealth-today (“The real danger is not inequality per se but bad policy 
that suppresses growth and thus the accumulation of wealth . . . .); Kenneth Rogoff, Where is the 
Inequality Problem?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 8, 2014), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/kenneth-rogoff-says-that-thomas-piketty-is-right-about-rich-countries--but-
wrong-about-the-world.  
 34 See, e.g., ANGUS DEATON, THE GREAT ESCAPE: HEALTH, WEALTH, AND THE ORIGINS OF INEQUALITY 1 (2013) 
(“Life is better now than at almost any time in history. More people are richer and fewer people live in 
dire poverty. Lives are longer and parents no longer routinely watch a quarter of their children die.”); 
Lucas, supra note 24 (“of the vast increase in the well-being of hundreds of millions of people that has 
occurred in the 200-year course of the industrial revolution to date, virtually none of it can be attributed 
to the direct redistribution of resources from rich to poor. The potential for improving the lives of poor 
people by finding different ways of distributing current production is nothing compared to the apparently 
limitless potential of increasing production.”); Rogoff, supra note 33. 




better off. A policy preference for allocative efficiency would seem to have at least 
played a large part in decades of global economic growth. 
But the so-what response clearly does not sit well,35 even among the “One 
Percent”—the top percentile of wage-earners or wealth-holders.36 Even if it could be 
said that the poor are better off in absolute terms in an unequal society, there is a 
nagging, growing unease that inequality does matter, and not just in a visceral sense 
of unfairness. Rather, the broad concern is that excessive inequality produces a 
society that in its totality is less well-off in some sense.37 In other words, inequality 
might not only be unfair but inefficient as well. So to those who shrug “so what?” 
there is a retort: a blind devotion to allocative efficiency as a norm at the expense of 
distributional concerns may generate laws and policies that are, ironically, 
allocatively inefficient.38  
The reticence of the economic profession is exasperating because it is clearly 
within the economic mainstream to study the effects of inequality on indices such as 
economic growth,39 crime,40 and educational outcomes.41 What is missing is the short 
leap from a descriptive and empirical account of these linkages to the normative claim 
made in this Article: inequality, if extreme enough, can lead to outcomes that are 
societally undesirable and allocatively inefficient. 
                                                 
 35 See Public Opinion on Income Inequality, 11 AEI POLIT. REP. 1, 1–7 (May 2015), 
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Political-Report-May-2015.pdf; Pew Research Ctr., 
Emerging and Developing Economies Much More Optimistic than Rich Countries About Future (Oct. 9, 
2014), http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/09/emerging-and-developing-economies-much-more-optimistic 
-than-rich-countries-about-the-future/.  
 36 See, e.g., Warren Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html; Bill Gates, Why 
Inequality Matters, GATESNOTES: THE BLOG OF BILL GATES (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.gatesnotes.com/ 
  Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-Century-Review. 
37 The thesis of this Article includes, but is not limited to, the claim that inequality can be inefficient from 
a purely neoclassical economic view. But this Article also makes the claim that inequality can make a 
society worse off in a way that is not captured by neoclassical economic models. For example, subjective 
well-being is increasingly considered a valid measure of societal welfare. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina, Rafael 
Di Tella, & Robert MacCulloch, Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?, 88 
J. PUBL. ECON. 2009, 2011 (2004); MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION (2012) (setting 
out a theoretical framework for comparing distributions in a social welfare function).  
38 Another article, and important precursor to this one, that has surveyed the literature is Paul L. Caron & 
James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic 
Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2012). The current article seeks to further disaggregate the mechanisms 
by which inequality may be allocatively inefficient, and to add to the list compiled by Caron and Repetti. 
39 See infra Part III.A. 
40 See infra Part III.C. 
41 See infra Parts III.A., III.B. 
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II. COMPETING NARRATIVES 
To a great extent, differences in opinion over inequality stem from different 
ideologies. The ideologies derive from opposing economic theories, but with empirical 
evidence somewhat spotty, political partisans have been left to fill in the blanks with 
their own ideological, often specious interpretations of theory and evidence. 
Seemingly academic economic debates thus matter because economic theory has come 
to play an enormously influential role in public law and policymaking, which has in 
turn played a central role in alleviating or exacerbating inequality. 42 Tax policy alone 
allocates trillions of dollars among Americans.  
One set of competing narratives draws upon fairly simple microeconomic 
notions. Every undergraduate student in Economics learns of the law of declining 
marginal utility of money: the more money someone has, the less each additional 
increment of money adds to that person’s happiness or utility.43 The first one hundred 
dollars a person has will be spent on absolute essentials, such as food and shelter, 
while subsequent one hundred increments are spent on things that are less and less 




The implication of this truism is a very general proposition that all other things 
being equal, a more equal distribution of money will place more people on a steeper 
part of the utility curve, achieving a higher level of utility for a greater number of 
people, as opposed to concentrating the money in one individual. Money means more 
to poor people than it does for rich people. 
There are equally simple, equally powerful competing narratives, however. For 
one thing, people have different preferences for wealth and trade wealth off 
differently against other tangible and intangible goods, such as material goods or 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., PAUL DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN THEORY AND POLICY: A REALISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET 
ORIENTED CAPITALIST ECONOMY 9–14 (2015); Alan S. Blinder, The Case Against the Case Against 
Discretionary Fiscal Policy, (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 100, 2004), 
https://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/100blinder.pdf.  
43 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffrey, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 WISC. L. REV. 71, 
76–77 (1994). 




leisure time,44 so that not everyone has the same declining marginal utility of money. 
Another counterargument is that it is important to preserve incentives for hard work. 
Some inequality exists because individuals are rewarded for productive effort and 
individuals differ in their ability and willingness to produce, so unequal allocations 
are to some extent just a natural outcome in a world where productive effort is 
rewarded.45 Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets propounded a theory that inequality was 
a necessary incident of economic growth. Market factor prices would cause unequal 
factor prices to converge and equilibrate at a higher level of wealth.46 By Kuznets’ 
account, inequality is ultimately self-correcting and nothing to worry about.47  
Another pair of competing narratives draws from macroeconomic theory. John 
Maynard Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money48 ranks as one 
of the most influential writings of all time, having been vindicated (rightly or 
wrongly) by expansionary fiscal policy that pulled the world out of the Great 
Depression.49 A core tenet of Keynesian economic theory is that in recessionary times, 
when spending is low, government spending can take the place of private spending, 
which would boost aggregate demand for goods, spur employment, and boost 
economic activity.50 Keynesian economics has implications for inequality because 
government spending is likely to have the greatest effect on the poor. Because poor 
individuals generally have a higher marginal propensity to consume (i.e. spend), 
money in the hands of poor people have a greater stimulative economic effect than if 
it were in the hands of rich people.51  
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Richard Layard, Guy Mayraz & Stephen Nickell, The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J. PUBL. 
ECON. 1846, 1846 (2008) (“[I]t is crucial to know how fast the marginal utility of income declines as income 
increases. . . . A natural way to do this is to weight each person’s changes in income by his or her marginal 
utility of income.”).  
45 See, e.g., Gustavo A. Marrero & Juan G. Rodriguez, Inequality of Opportunity and Growth, 104 J. DEV. 
ECON. 107, 107–08 (2013); Martin Ravallion, Inequality When Effort Matters (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 21394, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21394.pdf. 
46 Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1955). 
47 Id. 
48 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).  
49 President Roosevelt was not apparently convinced of Keynes’ theory, nor was his New Deal inspired by 
Keynes. However, the military spending that was necessitated by World War II was, in fact, the kind of 
stimulus that Keynes advocated. ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA, 1929-1941 
329 (1993). 
50 KEYNES, supra note 48, at 348–52; Alan S. Blinder, Keynesian Economics, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ECON. (2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html.  
51 Christopher Carroll, Jiri Slacalek, Kiichi Tokuoka & Matthew N. White, The Distribution of Wealth and 
the Marginal Propensity to Consume 1 (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/ 
cstwMPC.pdf. Moreover, spent money becomes income to the seller, who in turn spends some of that 
same money on her own needs, and so on, resulting in the same money being counted as income several 
times, or creating a multiplier effect of money, an empirically-derived factor that is used to evaluate the 
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But government spending is not free. One of several responses to Keynesian 
was “supply side economics,” which posits that long-term economic growth is affected 
not only by demand but also supply.52 Governments running huge, unsustainable 
deficits are likely to crowd out private investment and retard future growth.53 Supply 
side economics would argue for government policies to promote the formation of 
capital to produce goods that people supposedly demand.54 After all, money not spent 
is invested, which is also a predicate for production and consequent economic 
productivity.55  
A sensible synthesis of these two sets of competing narratives would 
acknowledge that none are universal; some situations call for redistribution and some 
call for government austerity, but government fiscal policy must be dictated by 
circumstance, not ideology. No self-respecting, modern Keynesian economist would 
deny that supply is irrelevant, a topic not even covered by Keynes.56 By the same 
token, during the depths of the 2008–09 global financial crisis, what has come to be 
known as simply the Financial Crisis, even prominent supply-side theorists 
advocated for strong fiscal action to stimulate aggregate demand.57 
Unfortunately, a sensible synthesis has not prevailed upon government fiscal 
policy. It has not even been true supply-side economics that has driven fiscal policy. 
Fiscal policy has been driven by a wayward faction of self-described supply-siders, 
ones that make much more aggressive and speculative claims than credible supply-
side economists. Prominent among them is Arthur Laffer, who famously propounded 
on a cocktail napkin his “Laffer Curve,” a putative relationship between tax rates and 
                                                 
effectiveness of fiscal policy. WALLACE C. PETERSON & PAUL S. ESTENSON, INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 172–76 (7th ed. 1992). 
52 Martin Feldstein, Supply Side Economics: Old Truths and New Claims, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 26, 26 (1986). 
53 See Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced-
Economy Episodes Since 1800, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (2012). This paper has been controversial, as a 
graduate student found an error in Reinhart et al.’s spreadsheet, which affected some of quantitative 
claims made in the paper. Reinhart and Rogoff argue that the errors did not change their conclusions. 
Peter Coy, FAQ: Reinhart, Rogoff, and the Excel Error That Changed History, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 18, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-18/faq-reinhart-rogoff-and-the-excel-error-that-
changed-history.  
54 Feldstein, supra note 5252, at 26. 
55 Income is commonly defined by the accounting identity Y ≡ C + I + G  showing that for a closed economy 
without exports or imports, income is the sum of consumption, investment, and government 
expenditures. See, e.g., PETERSON & ESTENSON supra note 50, at 82. That is, by definition, money not 
spent is invested (excepting government expenditures). Investment in capital is a fundamental 
ingredient to economic growth. See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic 
Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65, 69–70 (1956). 
56 Blinder, supra note 50. 
57 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Stimulus Plan We Need Now, WASH. POST, (Oct. 30, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/29/AR2008102903198.html.  




revenues, and argued that tax cuts would actually increase tax revenues.58 At some 
level this is true. But at current levels of income taxation in the United States, this 
idea is fantasy. Martin Feldstein, President Reagan’s Chief Economic Advisor and an 
architect of major federal income tax cuts of 1981 and 1984, has called the Laffer 
Curve the “height of supply-side hyperbole”59 and Laffer himself “a supply-side 
extremist.”60 Neither Laffer nor his supporters have marshalled any empirical 
evidence that high, personal income taxes reduce labor supply.61 
And yet, Laffer and his ilk remain extremely influential on fiscal policy.62 Tax 
cuts introduced by President George W. Bush in 2001, the “Bush Tax Cuts,” have 
been justified on the grounds that they would boost growth by creating jobs,63 a claim 
                                                 
58 The Laffer Ctr., The Laffer Curve, LAFFER CTR. (2014), http://www.laffercenter.com/the-laffer-center-
2/the-laffer-curve/.  
59 Feldstein, supra note 52, at 27. Feldstein continued: “I have no doubt that the loose talk of the supply-
side extremists gave fundamentally good policies a bad name and led to quantitative mistakes that not 
only contributed to subsequent budget deficits, but also made it more difficult to modify policy when those 
deficits became apparent.” Id. at 27–28. 
60 Id. at 29.  
61 See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, Robert E. Hall & Lawrence F. Katz, Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve 
from Six Decades of Tax Reform, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 2 (1999) (“As a testable 
hypothesis, however, the Laffer curve has not fared well. . . . More careful econometric analysis has not 
been any more supportive. An extensive literature in labor economics has shown that there is very little 
impact of changes in tax rates on labor supply for most people, particular for prime-age working men. 
This would seem to indicate that the central tenet of the Laffer curve is demonstrably false—marginal 
rates seem to have little impact on the amount that people work.”). It is true that more sophisticated 
theories have emerged that have the same implications as the Laffer Curve: Feldstein himself argues 
that high personal income tax rates do not discourage labor so much as they encourage the shifting of 
income into non-taxable forms. Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: 
A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 103 J. POL. ECON. 551 (1995). This, however fares little better 
as an empirical matter than the original Laffer Curve. Austan Goolsbee, Robert E. Hall & Lawrence F. 
Katz, Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve from Six Decades of Tax Reform, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 2 (1999). 
62 Jim Tankersley, Arthur Laffer Has a Never-Ending Supply of Supply-side Plans for GOP, WASH. POST, 
(Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/arthur-laffer-has-a-neverending-
supply-of-supply-side-plans-for-gop/2015/04/09/04c61440-dec1-11e4-a1b8-2ed88bc190d2_story.html 
(“No one has influenced Republican candidates’ thinking on the economy for the past four decades as 
much as Laffer . . . .); Rana Foroohar, Growth is Still All About Supply Side for Republicans, TIME (Nov. 
11, 2015), http://time.com/4107809/republican-debate-economics/. 
63 House Speaker John Boehner claimed on the Today Show on May 10, 2011, that the Bush Tax Cuts 
created 8 million jobs. Louis Jacobson, John Boehner Says Bush Tax Cuts Created 8 Million Jobs Over 
10 Years, POLITIFACT.COM (May 11, 2011, 12:26 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter 
/statements/2011/may/11/john-boehner/john-boehner-says-bush-tax-cuts-created-8-million-. GOP 
lawmakers still cling to this claim. The GOP continues to claim the Bush Tax Cuts have led to job 
creation, even recently, Jonathan Weisman, Economy Up, G.O.P. Wants a Little Credit, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 
10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/10/business/economy/economy-up-gop-wants-a-little-
credit.html (“‘There’s a positive story to tell since Republican took over the House, 9.6 million jobs 
12 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [5:1 
 
 
that lawmakers have clung to despite it having been debunked by even conservative 
analysts.64 Meanwhile, the Bush Tax Cuts have been highly regressive, boosting the 
incomes of the One Percent by 61.8% from 2002 to 2007, while boosting incomes of 
the bottom 99% by only 6.8%,65 and then only to be wiped out by losses from the 
Financial Crisis.66 Those continuing to advocate for tax cuts have argued that tax 
cuts are needed for “job creators,” who would use the extra money to employ 
workers.67 Skepticism and calls for tax equity that have risen up alongside Piketty’s 
book sales68 have been answered by catcalls of “class warfare.”69 
Even post-Financial Crisis, government fiscal policymakers seem to resist any 
Keynesian suggestions of infusing poor households with money. By any measure, the 
economic recovery following the Financial Crisis has been weak,70 and the evidence 
seems to point to depressed aggregate demand71 due to weak spending by the poor—
                                                 
created, the deficit cut in half, 98 percent of the Bush tax cuts locked in place.’” (quoting David Winston, 
a Republican pollster)). 
64 See, e.g., Rick Ungar, The Truth About the Bush Tax Cuts and Job Growth, FORBES (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/07/17/the-truth-about-the-bush-tax-cuts-and-job-growth/; 
David Boaz, One Bad and Eight Good Reasons to Cut Taxes, CATO INST. (Feb. 28, 2001), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/one-bad-eight-good-reasons-cut-taxes. This claim has also 
been debunked by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office: CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4570, 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF POLICIES CONTRIBUTING TO FISCAL TIGHTENING IN 2013, at 2 (Nov. 2012) (stating 
that allowing the Bush Tax Cuts to expire for couples making more than $250,000 and single individuals 
making more than $200,000 would increase GDP by 1.25 percent).  
65 Emanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated with 2012 
Preliminary Estimates) 6 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-
UStopincomes-2012.pdf); see also THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42131, CHANGES IN 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG TAX FILERS BETWEEN 1996 AND 2006: THE ROLE OF LABOR INCOME, 
CAPITAL INCOME, AND TAX POLICY 4 (2011) (Table 1, showing large increases for high-income individuals 
and falling income for the bottom twenty percent). 
66 See infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
67 A 2011 proposal by Republicans in the House of Representatives was entitled “Plan for America’s Job 
Creators,” REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., 112TH CONG., PLAN FOR AMERICA’S JOB CREATORS (2011), 
http://www.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/jobs/theplan.pdf, and pledged to “help business owners 
create jobs without raising taxes.” Press Release, Office of Speaker of the House, Helping Americans Get 
Back to Work is Our Number One Priority (May 26, 2011), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-
boehner-highlights-plan-america%E2%80%99s-job-creators). See also Jeremy W. Peters, G.O.P. Hopefuls 
Now Aiming to Woo the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), http:/.www.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/us/ 
politics/gop-hopefuls-now-aiming-to-woo-the-middle-class.html.  
68 See, e.g., Drew DeSilver, High-income Americans Pay Most Income Taxes, But Enough to be ‘Fair’? PEW 
RES. CTR., FACTTANK (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/24/high-income-
americans-pay-most-income-taxes-but-enough-to-be-fair/.  
69 Gary Cameron, Senior Senate Republican Accuses Obama of ‘Class Warfare’, REUTERS 
   (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/20/us-taxes-hatch-idUSKBN0KT1KR20150120.  
70 See, e.g., BEN BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 109–10 (2013). 
71 Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Consumers and the Economy, Part II: Household Debt and the Weak U.S. 
Recovery, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F., (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/ 
economic-letter/2011/january/consumers-economy-household-debt-weak-us-recovery/. 




because they are still poor!72 This fact would call for a Keynesian injection of money,73 
but that notion has been completely supplanted by the rubbish that supply-side 
charlatans are peddling and conservative politicians are disseminating—that is, the 
idea that giving money and regulatory breaks to “job creators,” such as finance 
institutions, will produce economic growth.74  
As another example of faux economics driving law and policy, deregulation of 
the finance and banking industries had been justified on the grounds that 
liberalization was needed so that American banks and financial firms could compete 
in a global finance industry and continue to create wealth and jobs domestically.75 A 
series of deregulations of the banking and finance sector, at the very least, played an 
important part in creating the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.76 At 
the same time, deregulation had the effect of amplifying compensation in the finance 
industry.77 The top 0.1%—dominated by individuals in finance78—now hold 22% of 
the nation’s wealth, which is about the same level as it did in 1929.79 All this 
regressive mayhem occurred because the banking and finance industries were able 
                                                 
72 More precisely, actually, the Ninety-Five Percent. See Barry Z. Cynamon & Steven M. Fazzari, 
Inequality, the Great Recession, and Slow Recovery, (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 9, 
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205524.  
73 See, e.g., Alan Auerbach & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion, 1–27 in 
FISCAL POL’Y AFTER THE FIN. CRISIS (A. Alesina & F. Giavazzi eds., 2012); Olivier Blanchard & Daniel 
Leigh, Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers, (IMF Working Paper No. 13/1, 2013) 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1301.pdf.  
74 See, e.g., THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, TAXES AND THE ECONOMY: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOPS TAX RATES SINCE 1945, at 1 (2012) (“The plan advocated by House 
Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan that is embodied in the House Budget Resolution . . . the Path 
to Prosperity, also proposes to reduce income tax rates . . . . Advocates of lower tax rates argue that 
reduced rates would increase economic growth, increase saving and investment, and boost productivity.”); 
TRANSCRIPT: Fox News-Google GOP Debate, FOX NEWS (Sep. 22, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com 
/politics/2011/09/22/fox-news-google-gop-2012-presidential-debate.html (“Americans want a leader who’s 
got a proven record of job creation. Number one, we get rid of Obamacare. Secondly, we pull back all of 
those regulations that are job-killing today, whether it’s Dodd-Frank or whether it’s the EPA.”) (quoting 
Texas Governor and Republican Presidential candidate Rick Perry)).  
75 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 973–75 (2009); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 73 (2014). 
76 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2011); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall 
Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1328–40 (2013). 
77 See Thomas Philippon & Ariel Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 1909–
2006, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1551, 1605 (2012). 
78 Benjamin B. Lockwood, Charles G. Nathanson & E. Glen Weyl, Taxation and the Allocation of Talent,124 
J. POL. ECON. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324424. 
79 Emaneul Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from 
Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 519 (2016).  
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to argue that less regulation would preserve their competitiveness and that their 
greater profits would mean more jobs.80  
It is clear that a wide variety of legislative and administrative actions that 
have led to increased inequality have been justified by something quite beyond what 
is credibly considered supply-side economics. Current levels of inequality have come 
about in large part because of the rhetorical power of an ideology of low taxes and 
economic deregulation, which has increased inequality and failed to deliver promised 
economic growth.81 But it has been an ideology that has clearly placed its stamp on 
economic law and policy, dragging the political spectrum so far to the right as to 
completely separate political ideology from economic reality. This Article seeks to 
restore economic reasoning to economic law and policy and strike a new balance 
between competing theoretical narratives concerning the need (or lack of need) to 
address economic inequality. 
III. HOW INEQUALITY CAN BE INEFFICIENT 
Inequality may be allocatively inefficient (and therefore produces suboptimal 
welfare states) in a variety of ways that are completely consistent with a strictly 
welfare maximization viewpoint. Welfare maximization, correctly done, thus requires 
that some attention be paid to distribution so as to avoid some inefficiencies and 
pathologies that arise out of inequality itself. This section sets forth several such ways 
in which inequality might generate inefficiency. 
This Article does not treat the related but separate problem of poverty. Poverty 
tends to be defined in absolute terms, such as an income level for a given number of 
dependent household members.82 This Article speaks to the need to address 
inequality, a relative state of affairs measuring differences among groups, not 
absolute levels of life quality. And again, this Article only seeks to present arguments 
                                                 
80 A central figure driving deregulation was former Senator Phil Gramm, co-sponsor of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, which removed regulatory barriers between retail banking and finance. Gramm has said of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which re-regulated some banking and finance activities, that it “has undermined a 
vital condition required to put money and America back to work — legal and regulatory certainty.” 
Michael J. de la Merced, Deregulator of Banks Set to Testify Before House, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/business/dealbook/deregulator-of-banks-set-to-defend-his-
actions.html.  
81 See, e.g., Hungerford, supra note 74, at 8–10 (“The statistical analysis . . . does not find that either top 
tax rate has a statistically significant association with the real GDP growth rate. . . . These results are 
generally consistent with previous research on tax cuts. Some studies find that a broad based tax rate 
reduction has a small to modest, positive effect on economic growth. Other studies have found that a 
broad based tax reduction, such as the Bush tax cuts, has no effect on economic growth. It would be 
reasonable to assume that a tax rate change limited to a small group of taxpayers at the top of the income 
distribution would have a negligible effect on economic growth.”). 
82 See How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/ 
income-poverty/poverty/guidance/poverty-measures.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2016). 




that inequality can produce inefficient outcomes. I acknowledge that economic theory 
is replete with accounts of how inequality can be a natural and efficient aspect of an 
effective free market.  
 Inequality Suppresses Capital Investment 
Atkinson, Piketty, and a group of economists led a re-engagement with the 
economic implications of inequality in the 1990s after a period in which it was 
commonly accepted that income or wealth inequality was either irrelevant to 
economic growth or was a positive factor for economic growth.83 Three arguments 
were offered in support of the view that inequality was associated with economic 
growth: (1) that the rich had a higher marginal propensity to save and therefore 
invest,84 and that providing more wealth to the rich increased the supply of 
investment funds, spurring economic growth;85 (2) some growth-enhancing 
investments tended to be large and indivisible so that some concentration of wealth 
was necessary for those investments to be made; and (3) the presence of inequality 
provided incentives for individuals to increase their effort and also to innovate.86 
These arguments rested on pivotal assumptions—for example, that a growth economy 
is limited by investment funds, not skilled labor—which seem not to have been 
seriously challenged.87 Nor did economists seem to obsess much over the omission of 
other crucial growth determinants, such as education and infrastructure.88 However, 
in the 1990s, with the rise of the study of human capital (education and informal 
                                                 
83 See Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli & Cecilia García-Peñalosa, Inequality and Economic Growth: The 
Perspective of the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1615, 1615 (1999). 
84 A standard identity in macroeconomic theory is that savings, the difference between income and 
consumption, is necessarily investment. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 63 (1936). There is sometimes confusion whether this is an 
accounting identity (true by definition) or an assumption of equilibrium conditions. See, e.g., A. 
Asimakopulos, Finance, Saving and Investment in Keynes’ Economics: A Comment, 9 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 
405, 405 (1985). But almost any growth theory would posit that at least the vast majority of savings 
would be invested in some productive manner, contributing in some way to economic growth. 
85 Very generally, a simple growth posits production as a function of labor and capital. See, e.g., Robert M. 
Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65, 69–70 (1956). So unless 
production requires capital and labor in fixed proportions, increasing capital would increase production 
and therefore economic growth. 
86 Aghion et al., supra note 83, at 1620. 
87  Nicholas Stern, The Determinants of Growth, 101 ECON. J. 122, 124 (1991). But the interdependence of 
labor stock and capital stock was noted influentially by Solow’s seminal A Contribution to the Theory of 
Economic Growth. See Solow, supra note 85. 
88 Id. at 129. 
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learning)89 and the emergence of development economics, a renewed interest in 
growth theory took root.90 Recognition that growth could be modeled endogenously 
and could be strongly affected by government policy seemed to raise new research 
and modeling questions and force a re-examination of prevailing notions about 
inequality.91 As economists looked at the difference between developed countries and 
developing countries, they could not help but notice vast inequalities of wealth among 
the former and began to ask questions about whether inequality played some role in 
determining growth.92  
Growth theory has typically focused on production, and more particularly on 
the capital investment required for production.93 It was thus natural to wonder, at 
some point, if inequality might impede economic growth because it meant that large 
swaths of a population might be too poor to invest in potentially productive capital. 
Lenders in an unequal society face borrowers that have sufficient collateral (rich 
people) and those who don’t (poor people), and lenders would therefore loan at 
different interest rates.94 An unequal society misses a huge opportunity by making it 
harder for the poor to borrow and invest.95 This constraint might hinder ordinary 
productive investments, like opening a small business, but might be even more 
unfortunate (and more inefficient) if it discouraged, as economic scholars suspect it 
                                                 
89 See Theodore W. Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POLIT. ECON. 571 (1960); Theodore W. 
Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1961); GARY S. BECKER, A THEORETICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 30–54 (3d ed. 1993). 
90 See Ravi Kanbur & Nora Lustig, Why is Inequality Back on the Agenda? 1 (Cornell Univ. Dep’t of Agric., 
Res., and Managerial Econ., Working Paper No. 99-14, 1999), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2645 
b8f2cf81613e353d3dd0ef7abd0991ad9d49.pdf. 
91 Stern, supra note 87, at 122–23. 
92 See, e.g., Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 600 
(1994); Atkinson & Bourguignon, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
93 Conventional economic theorizing and empirical analysis has tended to view capital as the limiting factor, 
since much of the under-developed world has so much inexpensive labor. See, e.g., Adrian Wood, Openness 
and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries: The Latin American Challenge to East Asian Conventional 
Wisdom, 11 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 33, 34 (1997) (“The belief that increased openness reduces wage 
inequality in developing countries rests on an apparently indisputable fact—that the supply of unskilled 
labor, relative to the supply of skilled labor, is larger in developing than in developed countries.”); Michael 
P. Todaro, A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Employment in Less Developed Countries, 59 AM. 
ECON. REV. 138, 138 (1969) (“[E]ven the most casual observer of these countries cannot help but be 
overwhelmed by the proportion of the urban labor force which is apparently untouched by the ‘modern’ 
economy.”). 
94 Thomas Piketty, The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate with Credit Rationing, 
64 REV. ECON. STUD. 173, 181–85 (1997). See also, Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and 
Macroeconomics, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 35, 36 (1993); Abhijit V. Banerjee & Andrew F. Newman, 
Occupational Choice and the Process of Development, 101 J. POLIT. ECON. 274, 276 (1993). 
95 Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Distribution and Growth in Models of Imperfect Capital Markets, 36 
EUR. ECON. REV. 603, 603–04 (1992); Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth 
and Development, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 151, 151 (1997); Banerjee & Newman, supra note 94, at 276 
(1993); Piketty, supra note 944, at 173–74 (1997); Galor & Zeira, supra note 94, at 36 (1993). 




does, investment in education.96 Inequality thus has a dynastic effect in that poorly-
educated families have little capacity to invest in education and improve their lot.97 
This dynastic effect is exacerbated because poorer families are more likely to be 
larger; to augment income and pool risks of family misfortune (such as illness), poorer 
families are likely to have more children, in turn making it more difficult for those 
children to invest in education.98 Even without considering the cost of maintaining a 
safety net for unproductive individuals, the lack of productivity is an enormous 
opportunity cost for society.  
Some economists with Keynesian inclinations also wonder if inequality 
reduces capital investment from the demand side. It is true that economic growth 
might be stunted by insufficient production caused by lack of investment. But it might 
also be true that economic growth might be stunted by insufficient demand. A person 
with 3,000 times the personal wealth of an average individual does not consume 3,000 
times as much as the average individual.99 Wealth inequality implies that fewer 
consumers can afford to purchase goods, which would suppress demand for goods and 
services, which would in turn suppress capital investment.100 Why invest in 
producing goods if there aren’t enough consumers out there with sufficient wealth to 
buy them? Moreover, an inefficiently small consumer base creates second-order 
inefficiencies: a smaller domestic goods market reduces product diversity and 
                                                 
96 W. Henry Chiu, Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance, 108 ECON. 
J. 44, 44–45 (1998); Galor & Zeira, supra note 94, at 36; José De Gregorio, Borrowing Constraints, Human 
Capital Accumulation, and Growth, 37 J. MONETARY ECON. 49, 50 (1996); Amparo Castelló & Rafael 
Doménech, Human Capital Inequality and Economic Growth: Some New Evidence, 112 ECON. J. C187, 
C187–89 (2002).  
97 Oded Galor & Hyoungsoo Zang, Fertility, Income Distribution, and Economic Growth: Theory and Cross-
Country Evidence, 9 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 197, 198–99 (1997); see Momi Dahan & Daniel Tsiddon, 
Demographic Transition, Income Distribution, and Economic Growth, 3 J. ECON. GROWTH 29, 29–30 
(1998). 
98 Cf. Nancy Birdsall & Juan Luis Londoño, Asset Inequality Matters: An Assessment of the World Bank’s 
Approach to Poverty Reduction, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 32, 36 (1997); Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, New 
Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth, 57 J. DEV. ECON. 259, 273 (1998); See also Castelló 
& Doménech, supra, note 96, at C187–89; Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: 
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competition in goods provision,101 and it consequently dampens the incentives to 
innovate and in turn dampens the economic growth that comes along with 
innovation.102  
It should not be surprising that inequality creates economic losses by 
suppressing consumption as well as production. If severe enough, inequality 
disenfranchises large parts of a population. To the extent that countries with high 
levels of inequality are leaving substantial groups of people behind, they are not just 
ill-serving those groups; they are ill-serving their entire populace by failing to 
capitalize on human resources. 
 Loss of Positive Human Capital Externalities 
Like other forms of capital, human capital—formal education or informal 
learning—is a factor of production and a key driver for economic growth.103 But 
human capital confers benefits that other forms of capital do not. Human capital 
helps drive the adoption of new technologies, as higher-skilled workers with richer 
human capital generate better ideas and are more able to adapt to changes in 
technology.104 Better still, human capital can produce knowledge spillovers as 
interactions among skilled individuals generate mutually beneficial enhancements to 
human capital.105 This is especially true if one examines the stock of human capital 
in a specific locality, where interactions are likely to take place, such that one 
explicitly considers the returns of education to a local economy.106 
The empirical evidence strongly suggests that inequality is negatively 
correlated with investment in human capital and thereby dampens economic 
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growth.107 Economists have long intuited the importance of education to economic 
growth.108 Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, in their book The Race Between 
Education and Technology,109 argue that the economic dominance of the United 
States for the latter half of the twentieth century was largely due to its broad public 
schooling system, which created an educated workforce able to adapt to technological 
changes and increase productivity.110 Young women,111 as well as young African 
Americans,112 benefited broadly and greatly. But more importantly for our purposes, 
the dissipation of inequalities in education did not place white males at a relative 
disadvantage; rather, the breadth of education in the American populace lifted up an 
entire populace, creating economic growth in excess of what could have been achieved 
without compulsory schooling.113 And by contrast, Goldin and Katz argue, the 
American failure to maintain that educational advantage after 1970 largely explains 
the country’s economic underperformance over this same period.114 In the United 
States, inequality that stratifies schooling into one system for haves and another for 
have nots is not only unjust but grossly inefficient.115  
 Inequality and Crime 
Crime has long been studied as a sociological problem.116 Nobel Laureate Gary 
Becker modeled crime as a purely economic problem, opening up a new and entirely 
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different literature, one that tended to view criminals, law enforcement agents, and 
potential victims all as rational actors, in stark contrast to sociological models of 
culture and norms.117 Again, this Article does not address the effects of poverty on 
efficiency, and so does not address the effects of poverty on crime. If poverty is the 
result of a lack of legal economic opportunities, then illegal opportunities become an 
increasingly rational alternative even in the face of potential sanctions. Inequality, 
by contrast, is not concerned with the situation of the potential criminal herself but 
her position relative to others. A potential criminal may not even be particularly poor 
but may be moved to crime by her relative position to others.  
Inequality may cause crime by breeding resentment, but for our purposes, it is 
more relevant that inequality can make crime, even violent crime, a rational course 
of action. Consider two individuals of equal age, size, and strength, but one is 
wealthier than the other. The wealthier individual, with more opportunities for 
wealth acquisition, would have more to lose from a violent encounter. The opportunity 
costs of violence are higher for the wealthier individual, and the poorer individual 
can exploit that asymmetry and threaten violence. In fact, the wealthier individual 
may even be larger, stronger, and quicker, and have an absolute advantage over the 
poorer one; but the poorer individual who has less to lose may still have a comparative 
advantage in violence.118 
Extrapolating from this two-person example, it is not hard to imagine that 
inequality creates a dangerous situation because of the asymmetry of opportunity 
costs. In societies with vast inequalities, some individuals will have very small 
opportunity costs of crime, perhaps even violent crime, with the result that they will 
enjoy a comparative advantage in violence. The rich can of course purchase some 
security with their vast wealth, obtaining an absolute advantage in violence, but that 
will not be enough to prevent those with little left to lose from initiating violence.119 
Even if the poor lose more in a violent clash, in the context of what can be gained and 
lost by violence, a clash will be more costly to the rich than the poor, which is exactly 
what the rich fear. 
Empirical validation of this phenomenon does face some data challenges. For 
one thing, crime underreporting is not only commonplace in all jurisdictions but 
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varied in its extent, making cross-sectional analyses difficult.120 For another, there is 
the question of what geographic unit of measurement is relevant: is it inequality 
within a country, state, county, city, or neighborhood?121 For yet another, 
measurement of inequality can be challenging. Measuring inequality by income elides 
the difficulty that individuals commonly have different incomes at different points in 
life that do not accurately represent lifetime earning potential.122 For example, 
graduate students may have low incomes but high future earnings potential and may 
consume more than the average low-income individual.123 Most researchers have 
simply tried their best to address data problems and disclose shortcomings.124 
But while data issues merit an asterisk, it is accurate to assert that a positive 
link exists between inequality and crime, violent and non-violent. At the end of the 
day, most studies have found a statistically significant relationship between 
inequality and crime.125 This relationship, where it is found, is usually 
distinguishable from the effect of poverty on crime.126 For our purposes, it seems 
sufficient to say that the link between inequality and crime serves as another 
economic justification for reducing inequality. 
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 Inequality and Political Instability 
There is enough of Karl Marx in Thomas Piketty for him to drop some dark 
hints of a grand clash between classes if wealth gaps continue to expand.127 Just a 
remote threat of violence or social unrest is enough to send investors fleeing for safer 
shores and thereby reducing economic growth.128 Worse still, the threat of social 
unrest raises borrowing costs for the government, further reducing the resources 
available in that country for public spending.129 Relatedly, the threat of violence or 
social unrest may induce executive action that infringes upon private property rights, 
again sending investors fleeing.130 A strand of political economy research thus 
examines the effects of inequality on political stability and consequently on economic 
growth.  
Using cross-country and time-series analyses, researchers have found that 
robust and statistically significant relationships exist between inequality and 
political instability131 and between political instability and economic growth over 
time.132 Political instability is operationalized by measuring the frequency of large 
political demonstrations and political assassinations, the number of fatalities 
stemming from incidents of mass violence, the number of serious attempts to 
overthrow a sitting government, and the frequency of actual changes in 
government.133 High levels of inequality have even been shown to be correlated with 
higher levels of terrorist activity.134 
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The existence of legal rights and a strong foundation in the rule of law have 
always been recognized as essential to economic prosperity and growth.135 But 
perhaps even more important is the existence of economic rights and opportunities to 
strive. What this research seems to highlight is the importance of the latter as a 
complement to the former.  
 The Erosion of Social Capital 
Since the publication of Robert Putnam’s book Bowling Alone,136 the study and 
measurement of “social capital” has occupied a prominent place in social science 
research, even among economists.137 Social capital is most commonly thought of as 
the variety of interpersonal and intra-organizational bonds that are formed for 
purposes of cooperation.138 Putnam defines social capital as “features of social 
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit.”139  
Putnam’s normative focus, and that of most sociologists, has been civic or 
community well-being. Putnam’s thesis was that social capital enhances political and 
civic life without consciously having these outcomes as objectives.140 Membership in 
bowling leagues, churches, and a variety of groups apparently made people better 
citizens without their knowing it.141 Conversely, a breakdown in social capital brings 
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on a variety of social ills, including poorer health,142 lower educational levels,143 and 
increased violent crime.144  
But in addition to social benefits, social capital confers important economic 
benefits. Significant efficiencies can be realized by cooperation within a social group 
or community that has built up a reservoir of trust.145 A well-known example is found 
in the Jewish diamond merchant business in New York City.146 In order to obtain a 
second opinion on the value of diamonds, merchants will entrust competing 
merchants with bags of diamonds with enormous value—tens or hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. Amazingly, stealing in this community is virtually non-existent 
because the social capital resident in this community is even more valuable; stealing 
or substitution would result in ostracism.147 But note the economic significance: the 
ability to obtain a reliable second opinion on diamonds worth thousands and tens of 
thousands of dollars is a huge benefit. Moreover, being able to do so without having 
to resort to formal enforcement mechanisms148 is a cost savings. Of course, it is 
possible for social capital to be marshalled for unproductive, even immoral purposes, 
such as organized crime or the Ku Klux Klan,149 or for rent-seeking;150 but this is also 
true of physical or human capital. The economic perspective is analogous to Putnam’s 
argument: social capital enhances economic productivity without consciously having 
economic productivity as its goal.151  
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Inequality imposes costs because it erodes trust and social capital.152 Trust and 
social capital are unfortunately likely to be low when parties are from different racial 
or ethnic groups.153 Economic inequality creates a similar sociological distance so that 
the greater the inequality, the lesser the trust.154 A Pew survey conducted in 2014 
asked respondents about their views on whether government should help the poor 
and whether they thought the poor “have it easy.”155 The results are reproduced in 
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The stark differences in attitude between the richest and the poorest are 
striking. It is shocking that more than half of people in the two richest quintiles 
actually believe that “poor people today have it easy,” when the average 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefit (food stamp benefit) is about 
$125 per month, or a little over $4 per day.156 In the United States, there is quite 
apparently a great sociological distance between rich and poor when it comes to how 
comfortably the poor live. 
Lower levels of trust and social capital are unfortunately costly. Clearly, one 
implication of the Pew study is that greater inequality has the ironic effect of 
discouraging giving from rich to poor.157 But it is not just that rich people are less 
charitable in their giving habits to help the poor, but that people of all income levels 
are less willing to contribute to civic engagement of all sorts.158 A general erosion of 
trust and social capital affects people’s view of policy and causes people to withdraw 
from social transacting. Cross-sectional studies show that the erosion of social capital 
caused by inequality causes a policy to disfavor public spending on all kinds of 
government programs and services,159 but most notably and most unfortunately, 
public education.160 The quality of government services is poorer in states where there 
is less reported trust.161  
For our purposes, it is most useful to consider how inequality erodes social 
capital and impinges on economic growth. Extrapolating from case studies, like that 
of the Jewish diamond merchant industry, up to a macro level, it is natural to 
hypothesize that economies with more social capital, and concomitantly more trust, 
were more economically productive.162 It is not difficult to imagine why: commercial 
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transactions are the stuff of economic growth, and as Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow 
once said, “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of 
trust.”163 Trust can displace the need for costly formal enforcement mechanisms, and 
the smaller the transaction costs, the more transactions.164 More trust requires less 
litigation, fewer defensive expenditures, and more innovation because of the more 
trustworthy environment.165 More trust leads to more accumulation of capital, 
especially human capital,166 which is perhaps the most critical growth 
determinant.167 
Note that this thesis has two stages: (1) that inequality erodes social capital 
and (2) loss of social capital reduces economic growth. Empirically validating this 
thesis thus requires establishing linkages for both stages. There are two approaches 
to empirical research in this area: (1) cross-sectional studies and (2) laboratory 
experiments. While data limitations and definitional questions warrant some 
caution, the totality of the research offers reasonably robust support for the thesis 
that inequality reduces social capital, which consequently reduces economic growth. 
Both cross-sectional studies and experiments offer support for the first stage 
of the thesis that inequality erodes social capital. There is the long-standing problem 
of how exactly to operationalize social capital: is it associational activity, such as 
belonging to clubs and civic organizations, or is it simply trust, as reported in general 
attitudinal surveys? Researchers examine both possibilities, mostly reporting both 
that inequality reduces associational activity168 (although ethnic heterogeneity plays 
an unfortunately stronger role)169 and reduces reported levels of trust.170 
Experimentally, as well, researchers have used inequality as a treatment effect and 
found that subjects placed in situations of inequality were less willing to contribute 
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to public good provisions, indicating a lower level of trust.171 Most troubling, 
inequality caused “richer” subjects to undercontribute, confounding a previously 
prevalent expectation that the rich contribute more so as to achieve a more equal 
allocation.172 
Validating the second stage—that erosion of social capital reduces economic 
growth—can only be accomplished with cross-sectional analysis, as no experiment 
can realistically model economic growth in a lab (though some researchers 
experimentally ask subjects to contribute to a public good that will lead to a higher 
future payoff, thus simulating economic growth).173 On this score, as well, more 
researchers have found a link than not. Working from well-established economic 
growth models,174 cross-sectional studies attempt to control for other growth 
determinants (most notably education) and then attempt to find a statistical 
relationship with some measure of social capital—most commonly associational 
activity or trust—and economic growth.175 A variety of reasons could exist for social 
capital being a determinant of growth. Some researchers have identified a specific 
pathway: social capital as a stimulant of innovative activity by facilitating productive 
collaborations and by instilling some faith and trust in institutions through 
associational activity.176 
On the whole, researchers have linked the loss of social capital to losses in 
economic growth. In retrospect, this thesis should have been obvious. Widening 
wealth gaps reduce the commonalities of experience between rich and poor, 
increasing alienation. Under such circumstances, it would be natural to expect less 
trust, less generosity, more suspicion, and a generally less collaborative and 
productive society. Similarity within a population in wealth, education, and 
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employment, help to create some assurance that certain social norms are shared and 
that transactions are likely to be undertaken with these social norms serving at least 
as a coordinating principle. All of this is frittered away with increasing inequality. 
 Inequality Increases Incentives for Rent-Seeking 
Why do nations fail? That is the very big question asked by Daron Acemoglu 
and James Robinson in their book of the same title.177 In their book, Acemoglu and 
Robinson document the economic and political histories of a variety of countries and 
societies, and show how the rise of exploitive, economically “extractive” institutions 
simultaneously thwart economic growth and enrich a small elite group (or even an 
individual).178 The book does not offer a fundamental explanation of why the 
extractive institutions arise in the first place, nor does it truly define “extractive 
institution.” The reader is asked to recognize an extractive institution when she sees 
it. Slavery,179 monopoly,180 and suppression of free speech181 are examples.  
It is true that extractive institutions produce unequal societies. But a critical 
lesson from Why Nations Fail has to do with the self-perpetuation of inequalities 
brought on by extractive institutions. As it turns out, once “inclusive” institutions—
ones that foster economic growth, acting as the opposite of extractive institutions—
are ruined and replaced by extractive institutions, they are extremely hard to 
reconstruct. Once extractive institutions have succeeded in enriching the few and 
imposing misery on the many, the quest for power becomes all-important and rent-
seeking becomes a default option. As opposed to creating a “virtuous circle” 
constructed from inclusive institutions and the rule of law, a “vicious circle” of 
poverty, misery, and concentration of wealth and power becomes entrenched.182 With 
so much at stake and with an inevitable weakening of the rule of law, rent-seeking 
becomes an indispensable option.  
The frightening upshot of Why Nations Fail is that it is dangerously easy for a 
country to slip down the greasy slope of rent-seeking down to the black hole of 
autocracy. The story, as told by Acemoglu and Robinson, of how so many nations 
failed in the past is the story of how some critical level of inequality raised the stakes 
for government policy, and ushered in a new political equilibrium that was predicated 
on the naked pursuit of power. Even after an autocratic, kleptocratic government is 
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toppled, the inequality remains, and the incentives for rent-seeking and disincentives 
for the rule of law remain. While rent-seeking is costly and harmful, the real danger 
may be that it creates inequalities that are extremely difficult to reverse.  
 Inequality Reduces Subjective Well-Being 
Economists concede that indices such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are 
very crude approximations for social welfare.183 The most compelling case for 
continued reliance on measures such as GDP for social welfare and on income and 
wealth for individual welfare seems to be that we can measure it.184 Those arguments 
have been influential as far as they go, but a growing unease about some critical 
shortcomings have intensified doubts about the accuracy of these metrics.185  
Rising concerns about inequality have cast a particularly dark cloud over 
traditional, aggregate economic indices, fueling skepticism. United States GDP rose 
from 1999 through 2008 (up to the Financial Crisis), even while most Americans 
experienced a decline in real income.186 Over the past forty years, mean household 
income in real dollars has risen by thirty-three percent while real median household 
income has been stagnant, rising only twelve percent.187 Over the same period, the 
share of income by the top one percent has risen from below ten percent to over twenty 
percent.188 By breaking down aggregate measures of statistics like income, 
economists such as Piketty and Saez have helped to erode the misplaced faith in 
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aggregate indices, giving a data-driven voice to those straining against the misplaced 
satisfaction in seeing gains in aggregate statistics. Inequality is in large part driving 
re-examination of faith in GDP and economically-based welfare analysis. 
At the same time, notable advances in alternative measurements have 
reinvigorated calls to at least include some alternative measurements to go alongside 
the traditional economic indices as supplemental indicators.189 Happiness, or 
subjective well-being (SWB), has emerged as a serious alternative to traditional 
economic indices. Happiness, or SWB indices, are constructed using self-reported 
data, typically collected through very broad surveys,190 such as the Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System administered by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention191 or the General Social Survey administered by the National Opinion 
Research Center.192  
Indices constructed from SWB data suffer from some of the same problems as 
economic indicators. Are measures of individual SWB additive, cardinal, or 
interpersonally comparable?193 How does one actually construct a social measure 
from individual responses?194 Is happiness all that matters? Maybe “meaningfulness” 
is more important to people than pure hedonic happiness or anything measured by 
reported measures of SWB.195 But even if alternatives are imperfect, rising concerns 
with inequality seem to provide an especially strong case for diversifying away from 
indicators such as GDP. GDP captures none of what is compelling about inequality: 
the mere volume of economic transactions says nothing about the parties to 
transactions, and what is troubling about inequality is the fact that many are being 
left out. In light of such glaring omissions, even an imperfect measure of the 
discontent brought on by inequality is likely to provide some information.  
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SWB research using data on a national level generally finds that over time, 
increases in income (which might be measured by GDP) have failed to generate 
increases in SWB.196 Getting at the discontent caused by inequality requires that 
data be analyzed using the individual as the unit of analysis: Are individual people 
more likely to report unhappiness if they live in a situation of greater income or 
wealth inequality? SWB research suggests a negative correlation between SWB and 
inequality.197  
In thinking about why inequality might lead to unhappiness, one strong 
hypothesis rooted in a long line of psychological research is that individual happiness 
depends significantly on an individual’s comparison with local peers. Thus, if one 
lives in a city with large inequalities, then one might be more envious if one is poor, 
or one might be more suspicious if one is rich.198 Or, inequality might give rise to a 
perception of lack of fairness and a lack of trust.199 Overall, while the results are not 
unambiguous, the predominance of the research shows a negative link between SWB 
and income inequality.200 Having more money makes most people happier,201 as does 
marriage.202 Involuntary unemployment makes almost everyone very unhappy.203 
But all other things being equal, living in a situation with inequality makes an 
individual less likely to be happy than otherwise. 
This line of research comports well with intuitions about inequality and 
general happiness. In a sense, the propensity of inequality to generate unhappiness 
ties together all of the subsections preceding this one. Each of the subsections in this 
part describe how a divergence in wealth or income creates some social or economic 
problem. Individually, these deviations from some innate expectation might be 
unnoticeable. But inequality has become not only noticeable, it has become a source 
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of widespread concern. It is as if the accumulation of these small deviations have 
suddenly welled up and been brought into public consciousness.  
IV.  TOWARDS REVERSING INEQUALITY: THE ROLE OF LAW, AND OF ECONOMICS 
A second objective of this Article is to press the case for reversing inequality, 
but to do it in a way that is consistent with economic growth. If inequality is 
objectionable in part because it is allocatively inefficient, then measures to cure 
inequality should not themselves be inefficient. Piketty’s thesis that inequality is 
increasing because the returns to private capital exceed the rate of economic growth—
expressed in his now-famous relation r > g—has been criticized for its universality,204 
its relevance,205 and its underlying data, faultily handled by Piketty (according to his 
critics).206 But the relation usefully reframes inequality as at least partly a problem 
of economic growth, which meets no disagreements from any economist. If inequality 
increases because r > g,207 then at least one answer is to find ways to increase 
economic growth.  
However, not all measures to stimulate economic growth are created equal. 
Enough harm has been wrought by, borrowing from Martin Feldstein’s words, 
“supply side extremists.”208 Economic growth policies have to be grounded in sound 
economics, not the snake oil economics that has insinuated itself into partisan politics 
and lawmaking. Unfortunately, snake oil economics often presents itself as a formula 
for job creation and economic growth. How can one tell the difference? 
There is no magic spell that can distinguish between sound economics and 
snake oil economics, much less a way of holding legislatures accountable for economic 
belief systems that border on astrology. But it is possible to do some informal sorting 
of laws and policies that purport to contribute to economic growth but seem to produce 
outsized rents to particular industries or groups. The most useful way to attack 
inequality is to focus on specific laws and policies that seem to contribute much more 
to private returns to capital (r) than they do to economic growth (g). In other words, 
laws or policies in which ∆r >> ∆g should be carefully scrutinized and re-evaluated 
for its impacts on economic growth. First, when it can be said of a law or policy that 
∆r >> ∆g, there is a heightened possibility that it contributes to economic inequality, 
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since it is bringing about or exacerbating Piketty’s r > g condition. Second, when there 
is a connection between a law or policy and a spectacularly high return on private 
capital, there is the distinct possibility that the law or policy in question is wealth-
reducing, naked rent-seeking.209 In fact, the larger the returns to private capital, the 
more it is worth spending to obtain those rents. Few and far between are those 
economic laws and policies that miraculously create spectacular wealth in one sector 
or group that also redounds to the benefit of the larger polity. A third and related 
point is that when a law or policy dramatically and suddenly boosts returns to private 
capital in one sector or industry, it is potentially inducing a misallocation of 
resources, especially investment capital. As Eric Posner and Glen Weyl have argued, 
the finance sector has been shockingly well-paid, five times that of all academic 
research, a subset of which—medical research—has produced the equivalent of $3.2 
trillion of benefit every year since 1970.210 It is a fair bet that the finance sector has 
not produced $16 trillion annually in wealth over that time period. 
Granted, saying of a law or policy that ∆r >> ∆g is necessarily an informal 
observation, as there is never a counterfactual against which to measure economic 
growth or returns to private capital. Could we ever say such a thing? The answer is, 
in fact, yes: judgments about rent-seeking are made quite frequently and routinely, 
without necessarily resorting to empirical analysis.211 
To canvass the law and find all instances in which ∆r >> 0 and Δg is either 
negative or very small is a task beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, in keeping 
with the general theme of this Article—that inequality in extreme forms can be 
allocatively inefficient—I discuss two cases to outline a growth-increasing approach 
to reducing inequality. First, I discuss one case in which Δr >> 0 and Δg < 0, the 
deregulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. The systemic risk of catastrophic 
loss created by unregulated trading of derivatives is a boon to traders and a clear case 
of government failure. As such, the re-regulation of OTC derivatives is exactly the 
kind of growth-improving measure that should be implemented to reduce inequality. 
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Second, I discuss a case in which Δr < 0 but it is likely that Δg < 0: an increase in the 
minimum wage. The economic analysis of minimum wage increases is surprisingly 
deep, but still inconclusive.212 But even if we were to accept that a minimum wage 
hike reduces inequality, it is potentially counterproductive in that it may impinge 
upon economic growth.213 Such a legal response might just be inadvisably blunt, given 
the plethora of alternative measures to raise economic growth more broadly. 
 The Re-Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Banking and finance, previously separate industries, have undergone 
deregulatory changes through a series of legislative and administrative moves over 
two decades.214 The total effect of all of the moves has been spectacularly lucrative 
for the banking and finance sector as a whole, even if there have been individual 
casualties. Never mind the most notorious instances of banditry, such as Lehman 
Brothers CEO Richard Fuld’s $480 million payout for navigating Lehman into the 
largest bankruptcy in history (while seeking a government bailout);215 the banking 
and finance sector as a whole has done extremely well throughout the Financial Crisis 
and the recovery since. Thomas Philippon and Ariel Reshef estimate that the 
educational wage premium for those in the finance industry, vis-à-vis other 
industries, adjusting for skill intensity and job complexity, to be 250 percent that of 
comparable professions.216 Banking and finance have been, and have become even 
more so, extraordinarily over-compensated sectors.217 The private returns to capital 
have been spectacular. And while the Financial Crisis obviously visited enormous 
losses upon the finance industry, the recovery has been uneven, to say the least. The 
One Percent lost so much, just because they held so much of the lost wealth—thirty 
percent218—but those on the lower rungs of the wealth ladder lost a larger portion of 
their wealth and had a much smaller household buffer (if they had one at all) to 
absorb losses.219 Perhaps most stunning, ninety-five percent of total income gains in 
                                                 
212 See infra notes 268–72 and accompanying text. 
213 See infra notes 273–73 and accompanying text. 
214 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2011); Wilmarth, supra note 74, at 1328–40. 
215 Aaron Smith, Fuld Blames ‘Crisis of Confidence’, CNN MONEY (Oct. 6, 2008, 6:22 p.m.), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/06/news/companies/lehman_hearing/index.htm?postversion=2008100616. 
216 Thomas Philippon & Ariel Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 1909–2006, 
127 Q. J. ECON. 1551, 1605 (2012). 
217 Posner & Weyl, supra note 33. 
218 Piketty, supra note 31, at 348. 
219 Whereas the net worth of the 95th percentile household lost over $200,000 but suffered only a 13% drop 
in net worth, the median household in the United States fell over $27,000 to $68,365—a 28% drop. Fabian 
T. Pfeffer, Sheldon Danziger & Robert F. Schoeni, Wealth Disparities Before and After the Great 
36 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [5:1 
 
 
the United States from 2009 to 2012 accrued to the top one percent of income 
earners.220  
And what of the effects of deregulation and consolidation for economic growth? 
Without a counterfactual, it is impossible to say, but even before the Financial Crisis 
laid bare the sharp contrast between compensation in the finance industry and its 
contribution to economic prosperity, studies suggested that the finance industry 
imposes shockingly large negative externalities.221 Certainly, in the wake of the 
Financial Crisis, in which $15 to $30 trillion of wealth was lost,222 no serious 
contention is made that the package of banking and finance deregulations over the 
past two decades have been positive for economic growth. Given the staggering wealth 
lost, if the contested assertions223 that the package of banking and finance 
deregulations caused the Financial Crisis are even partially correct, it would be 
implausible to argue that deregulation of the sector was economically beneficial. 
One reason this crisis was particularly brutal on the less wealthy is because it 
produced a widespread withdrawal of credit. The Financial Crisis was an old-
fashioned bank run,224 only on a new “securitized banking” system made possible by 
the combination of deregulations undertaken in the decades prior.225 Credit 
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2012 Preliminary Estimates) at 6 tbl.1 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://currydemocrats 
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221 See, e.g., Kenneth R. French, The Cost of Active Investing, 63 J. FIN. 1537, 1538 (2008). 
222 See, e.g., Tyler Atkinson, David Luttrell & Harvey Rosenblum, How Bad Was It? The Costs and 
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government support offered in reviving economic activity. 
223 A majority (six out of ten) of the Congressionally-commissioned body charged with analyzing the causes 
of the crisis, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, found that banking and finance deregulation was 
a substantial cause of the Financial Crisis. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REP. OF THE NAT’L 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvii–xxviii (2011), 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173617/http://www.fcic.gov/about. The four 
dissenting members of the Commission pointedly disagreed with the parts of the report that emphasized 
deregulation, and propounded their own view that global capital flows bore significant blame for the 
crisis. Id. at 417–19. 
224 See, e.g., Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008, 97 
J. FIN. ECON. 319, 319–20 (2010). 
225 Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on the Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 
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disappeared for a wide swath of businesses, causing many to fail or contract and to 
lay off workers, which compounded itself as the newly unemployed (and even those 
hanging onto their jobs) dramatically cut back on spending.226 In 2008 and 2009, 
nearly nine million Americans lost jobs—eight hundred thousand in the single month 
of January 2009.227 The job losses were wide and deep enough to deposit nine million 
Americans into poverty from 2007 to 2010.228 
This catastrophic credit crisis, with its regressive effects on employment, can 
be traced in large part to the deregulation of OTC derivatives,229 the product of a 
decades-long lobbying effort.230 In 1989, the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) was headed up by Wendy Gramm, the wife of Senator Phil 
Gramm, a central architect of banking and finance deregulation. The banking and 
finance industries sought and secured from Gramm’s Commission a safe harbor for 
one type of derivative, a “swap transaction,” used by banks to hedge risk from interest 
rates.231 Other liberalizations followed. The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 
authorized the CFTC to exempt some derivatives in addition to swaps and also pre-
empted any state laws purporting to regulate OTC derivatives.232 After a series of 
spectacular derivative-driven failures, including the bankruptcy of Orange County’s 
pension fund and a $4 billion bailout of the hedge fund Long Term Capital 
                                                 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14361, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14631 .pdf. But even 
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Evidence From the 2008-9 Financial Crisis, 129 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2013); NANCY GREEN LEIGH & EDWARD J. 
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http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet (last visited June 29, 2014). 
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people.html  (last visited October 26, 2016). 
229 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2011); Wilmarth, supra note 74. This was certainly the majority view of The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
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230 A historical summary is provided by Stout, supra note 229, at 11–20. 
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Management, talk of reigning in derivative trading resurfaced.233 CFTC Chair 
Brooksley Born sought to re-regulate OTC derivatives trading, but was shouted down 
by a “stampede” of lobbyists, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and 
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin.234 The culmination of this deregulatory effort was 
passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,235 which completed 
deregulation of speculative financial products, including credit default swaps.236  
Following the CFMA, trade in derivatives increased more than sixfold, from 
$94 trillion in the first half of 2000237 to almost $600 trillion during the second half 
of 2007.238 The result can be (and was, in the case of the Financial Crisis) the 
development of a derivatives market much larger than the value of the underlying 
collateral asset itself. Speculation using OTC derivatives ran rampant because 
unregulated derivatives were so much easier to obtain for hedging than actually 
purchasing a countervailing position.239 Critically, OTC derivatives could be issued 
on the same event multiple times,240 allowing a $1.3 trillion market on subprime 
mortgages to wipe out $11 trillion of wealth.241 
It is not hard to understand why banking and finance companies lobbied so 
hard for so long to deregulate the trading of OTC derivatives. The zero-sum 
gambling242 introduced by derivatives is not zero-sum for banks at all. Derivatives 
are a subsidy. Trading in derivatives increases risk, but much of the downside risk is 
insured in case of default.243 Also, for finance firms trading on behalf of clients, OTC 
derivatives are lucrative business: reporting of OTC-derived income is not mandated, 
                                                 
233 FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 229 
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241 Stout, supra note 229, at 28–29 (explaining how a market in subprime mortgages worth a total of $1.3 
trillion necessitated government infusions of over $3 trillion, and wiped out wealth in excess of $11 
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242 This is the term used by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl to describe derivatives, as well as Lynn Stout, to 
describe the zero-sum nature of derivatives trading. No risk hedging is accomplished by most derivatives, 
only speculation with no net gains, and lots of commissions for derivatives trading companies. Eric A. 
Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to 
Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1316 (2012); Lynn A. Stout, Why the 
Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE 
L.J. 701, 712 (1999). 
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but Goldman Sachs estimated that from 2006 to 2009, twenty-five percent to thirty-
five percent of its revenues were generated from derivatives trading.244 Goldman 
Sachs net revenue for 2007 was about $46 billion dollars,245 so twenty-five percent to 
thirty-five percent of that is a lot of money. 
Worst of all, the nature of the risk created by speculation using OTC 
derivatives was systemic.246 Even the fractious Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
agreed that among those speculators that failed, there was “appallingly bad risk 
management.”247 While some of those guilty of speculating recklessly were, in some 
sense, punished (such as Lehman Brothers), the breadth of the risk created enveloped 
nearly the entire American economy. Credit drying up for speculators was also credit 
drying up for the vast majority of American businesses that depended on credit for 
cash flow to conduct their business and employ workers. So the risk happened to be 
much more widespread than that assumed (unwittingly) by wealthy managers taking 
risks on behalf of their wealthy clientele.248 The breadth of that risk, affecting all 
debtors, is an externality.249  
Finally, risk itself is a source of wealth inequality. The wealthier can better 
afford to take risks, and over the long run, a portfolio with more risk generates higher 
returns. Enabling risk-taking is the law’s way of inflating the returns to capital—
Piketty’s r. Seen in that light, all of the deregulations sought and obtained by the 
financial industry appeared desirable to wealthy investors. Risk is good for those that 
can afford to take it, and OTC derivatives create risk. 
The Financial Crisis was horrifying enough to result in passage of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd Frank”)250 which, 
among other things, required banks to transfer their derivatives holdings to non-bank 
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affiliates.251 It is not as if Dodd-Frank re-regulated OTC derivatives, as Lynn Stout 
has called for.252 But by forcing federally-insured banks to transfer derivatives to non-
banks, Dodd-Frank at least took the American taxpayer off the hook for speculating 
losses. Even this was too much for the finance industry, which used the occasion of a 
threatened government shutdown to insert a provision amending section 716 of Dodd-
Frank,253 putting the American taxpayer back on the hook and allowing, once again, 
federally insured banks to trade in OTC derivatives. 
Some of the risk associated with OTC derivatives has been alleviated by the 
mandate under Dodd-Frank for a “swaps clearinghouse,” so that most non-commodity 
swaps must be carried out through a “derivatives clearing organization that is 
registered under this Act.”254 The idea is that the regulated clearinghouses can—and 
are required to—better ascertain the robustness of the proffered collateral than the 
likes of AIG.255 However, as Mark Roe and others have argued, clearinghouses do not 
actually reduce the kinds of systemic risk that befell markets during the Financial 
Crisis and do not actually alleviate the risk;256 there is no reason to believe that the 
“derivatives clearing organizations” will have the incentives or the tools to spot poorly 
priced assets any better than the failed institutions.257 At the end of the day, with 
section 716 effectively repealed, trading in OTC derivatives is still legalized gambling 
with the downside risk implicitly assumed by the American taxpayer, and the fruits 
of such risk-taking accruing to those that have the means to take it. 
Obviously, if Congress is willing to do Wall Street’s bidding to amend section 
716 of the Dodd-Frank Act—which was not even a regulation of derivatives—then a 
push to re-regulate OTC derivatives would face considerable political headwinds in 
the near-term. The purpose of this Article, however, is to re-engage efficiency 
arguments for reducing inequality and to identify opportunities to reduce inequality 
in a manner that is consistent with economic growth, laying the groundwork for a 
longer-term initiative. Along those lines, the idea of re-regulating OTC derivatives, 
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which serve no purpose other than to further enrich wealthy financiers at a huge net 
cost to the economy and to the non-wealthy, is low-hanging fruit. 
 An Increase in the Minimum Wage  
With the rise in concern over inequality, one obvious solution is to raise the 
minimum wage, automatically raising the income of some of the lowest-wage workers. 
The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour, which is where it has been 
since 2009.258 Some cities in which protest over inequality has been noisiest—Seattle, 
Los Angeles, Washington, and Chicago—have passed minimum wage laws, with 
Seattle and Los Angeles mandating a minimum wage of fifteen dollars per hour, and 
Washington and Chicago lower amounts.259 Voters in San Francisco and Oakland 
have approved similar measures, and proposals are underway in New York and San 
Diego.260 The minimum wage hike idea is simple and has been gaining popularity in 
recent years, as concerns of inequality intensify.261  
Apart from a handful of scholars that have grappled with the nuances of a 
minimum wage increase,262 the debate over minimum wage hikes has been driven by 
two competing, simplistic, and ideological ways of thinking about the minimum wage: 
(1) that inequality can be reduced by lifting up poor wage workers by blunt legal 
force263 and (2) that raising the minimum wage increases labor costs and causes 
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employers to reduce the number of jobs available.264 Both of these ideological 
assertions contain just enough truth to be plausible. But the economic truth is, as it 
always inconveniently seems to be, dependent on unknowable specifics. On the one 
hand, it is not clear that a minimum wage hike would help those that one would 
consider “needy.” The minimum wage work force is small to begin with—3.8 million 
in 2011, representing only 5.2% of all hourly-wage workers.265 Of those, half are under 
the age of twenty-five, indicating that the lower end of the pay scale is crowded by 
younger workers, as we might expect, but not necessarily the most needy.266 It is true 
that significant increases in the minimum wage would boost the wages of not only 
those working at or below the minimum wage, but also those making slightly more; 
among those might be people that are targeted for relief: the working poor that are 
struggling to stay above the poverty level, including those with dependent children.267 
But low-wage employment situations are so heterogeneous that it is difficult to say 
definitively who would benefit from a minimum wage hike. The effect of a minimum 
wage hike on poverty remains uncertain.268 
On the other hand, the opposition to a minimum wage hike is based on unclear 
empirical support as well. In a seminal and still-controversial 1994 article, David 
Card and Alan Krueger studied the effect of a minimum wage increase in New Jersey, 
comparing employment dynamics in New Jersey with that of neighboring 
Pennsylvania.269 Card and Krueger failed to find the predicted contraction of 
employment in New Jersey,270 confounding what had been strong conventional 
economic theory at the time.271 Moreover, Card and Krueger found a small positive 
effect on employment in New Jersey, which they attributed to lower turnover and 
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savings in retraining new employees and to possible monopsonist behavior by 
employers.272  
Many critiques and a few affirmations of this landmark study followed,273 but 
over time, most economists seem to have accepted that a minimum wage hike might 
reduce employment but that the effects are small.274 It is also more widely accepted 
among economists that a minimum wage hike would have only modest effects on 
inequality, only helping some of those at the lowest income levels.275 
A 2013 survey of top American economists at Harvard, Stanford, MIT, 
Berkeley, Yale, Stanford, and Chicago was mixed in terms of their support for a 
raising of the federal minimum wage to nine dollars per hour.276 When asked whether 
they agreed with the statement “[r]aising the federal minimum wage to nine dollars 
per hour would make it noticeably harder for low-skilled workers to find 
employment,” thirty-four percent agreed, thirty-two percent disagreed, and twenty-
four percent were uncertain. Some of the world’s top labor economists, such as David 
Cutler of Harvard and Austan Goolsbee of Chicago (once President Obama’s Chief 
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Economic Advisor) replied “[u]ncertain.”277 Proposals at the state level, even in liberal 
states, have been greeted with unease, even by those who advocate for greater 
economic equality.278 In light of the prevalence of fifteen dollars-per-hour proposals, 
however, the same economists were surveyed about the minimum wage hike up to 
that higher amount; that seemed to garner some more negative reactions, with more 
expressing the belief that unemployment would increase and aggregate output would 
contract.279 
 So it turns out that in addition to providing top-notch political theater, 
minimum wage hikes make for lively and animated academic debate as well. But at 
the end of the day, even economists who support a minimum wage seem 
unenthusiastic. Neither Stiglitz nor Piketty have had much to say recently about a 
minimum wage hike.280 In Inequality: What is to be Done?, Atkinson compiled a list 
of fifteen proposals for reducing inequality; a “statutory minimum wage set at a living 
wage” is one,281 but he devotes little text to this proposal and expresses doubt: 
Does the Minimum Income Standard provide a foundation for defining a low-pay 
standards? Doubts must arise. If we examine the details of the wage requirement 
derived from the Minimum Income Standard, we see that it varies across family types. 
. . . The minimum wage cannot do all the work on its own.”282 
The verdict on a minimum wage increase as a legal tool to address inequality seems 
to be that it is blunt and probably not very effective. A Congressional Budget Office 
study found that raising the federal minimum wage to $9 would lift 300,000 out of 
poverty but would cost 100,000 jobs, with larger figures for a hike to $10.10.283 These 
numbers are not trivial, nor are they worth the inordinate attention and political 
posturing surrounding this idea. The problem with a minimum wage hike is that, 
while it may reduce the returns to private capital, there is some risk that it would 
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also reduce economic growth. In Piketty’s parlance, it does no good to implement a 
policy for which Δr < 0 if it also imposes Δg < 0. If the problem of inequality is that it 
is inefficient, then the answer cannot be to impose more inefficiencies, however 
modest they may be. 
CONCLUSION 
Distributional issues have efficiency implications. To be sure, the relationship 
between distribution and efficiency is complicated, but it is no longer tenable to take 
Robert Lucas’ position that economics should never concern itself with inequality. At 
certain levels of inequality and under certain circumstances, an increase in inequality 
in either wealth or income will reduce social welfare. That reduction may or may not 
be measurable by traditional economic metrics, but it is widely accepted that welfare 
changes can occur without being reflected in such metrics.  
Not only should economists concern themselves with inequality, but the 
cautionary tale stemming from the bogus supply-side economics still taking up 
residence on Capitol Hill and the equally speculative claims about the benefits of a 
minimum wage hike is that economists also have a crucial role to play in setting legal 
policy that implicates inequality. If Piketty is just heuristically correct—that r > g 
characterizes the dynamics of inequality, then much work is to be done, and sound 
economic analysis must be a crucial component of any legal policymaking that 
implicates inequality. Given the multitude and complexity of factors that affect 
returns to private capital and that affect economic growth, there is no quick and easy 
way to undo decades of inequality-producing law and policy. The r > g formula 
suggests structural changes are required. 
Some care must be taken to find ways to narrow the gap between r and g. There 
are certainly ways to reduce returns to private capital, but many of them would run 
against the grain of a legal system that instinctively protects legal expectations.284 
The most egregious enrichments of wealth should eventually be susceptible of 
reform—compensation in the banking and finance industry, the re-regulation of OTC 
derivatives, and an increase in the estate tax285—but others might be undertaken 
more gingerly. The complexity is that measures promoted as growth enhancing are 
rarely so.  
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The harder, but surer path to reducing inequality is to focus on laws and 
policies which more broadly and clearly stimulate economic growth and which 
redound to the benefit of the non-wealthy. There are certain fundamental widely 
accepted drivers to economic growth—quality education accessible to the entire 
populace,286 a physical and electronic infrastructure that is sufficient to support 
trade,287 a reasonable investment environment free of confiscatory regulation or 
policy,288 and the minimization of environmental and health hazards that threaten 
human development.289 As between knocking down r or boosting g, it is most 
constructive to find ways to increase g, the rate of economic growth, with an emphasis 
on how to ensure that the non-wealthy participate meaningfully in economic growth 
and receive the benefits of doing so. So, for example, focusing on broadly accessible 
education as a “force of convergence” in Piketty’s parlance is one way to address both 
economic growth and reducing inequality.290 That educational reform has proven to 
be so vexing, speaks to the magnitude of the challenge, not its desirability, as no 
economist disputes the importance of education in fostering economic growth.291 
Reducing inequality is likely to require a long, sustained effort. In large part, 
current levels of inequality have come about because of rent-seeking, enabled by 
specious claims of economic benefits generated by some pet industry. There are no 
magic bullets. If reducing inequality were simple, the world would be nearly free of 
it. 
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